Sam Hewitt – 2019

In her essay “Who is the Happy Warrior,” Martha Nussbaum, professor of law and ethics at the University of Chicago, investigates previous conceptions of happiness and relates them to her objective-list theory. She does this with the goal of clearing up the confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the existing literature. Her argument progresses from an overview and critique of these previous theories of happiness to clarification and justification of her objective-list theory. I would argue that while incredibly nuanced and thorough, Nussbaum’s defense in response to the accusation that her theory limits individual liberty is weak. The defense of her objective-list theory of happiness is predicated on the argument that her list of basic human capabilities doesn’t impede individual choice and thus is not paternalistic or prescriptive but rather conducive to individual liberty. I would assert that her reasoning is not sufficiently convincing. 

Nussbaum initiates her essay by exploring several questions to gain greater clarity of the relevant underlying ideas. The first of these questions is what is pleasure, which is aimed at unraveling the hedonistic conception of happiness as attributed mainly to Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill. After explaining the hedonistic theory of happiness, which simplifies happiness down to units of pleasure, Nussbaum asserts that this view is flawed in that it ignores the differences in qualitative experiences of pleasure, and in so doing, simplifies happiness to the point that ignores these important differences. As an example, Nussbaum explains how “the pain one experiences with a headache is vastly different from losing a loved one.” Nussbaum does not present a sophisticated attack against the hedonistic conception of happiness, partly because she views the conception too basic and thus discredits it on this reasoning alone.

Furthermore, Nussbaum asserts that Aristotle and Mill, would both hold that qualitative differences in pleasure are relevant, which in her mind likely further discredits hedonism. The next question that Nussbaum addresses is: what is satisfaction with one’s life? Here she addresses the eudaimonistic conception of happiness, which is the view that happiness is overall satisfaction with one’s life. Nussbaum makes the distinction between pleasure and satisfaction, stating that satisfaction is simply a judgment that is independent of pleasure. She uses the last words of Mill to illustrate this point. John Stewart Mill’s final words were, “you know I have done my work.” Nussbaum points out that in his last moments, Mill was experiencing physical pain, and fear despite his being satisfied with his life as a whole, which to her suggests that satisfaction is more of a judgment than a sensation or feeling. Nussbaum illustrates a flaw in a satisfaction account of happiness, by pointing out that personally, having a satisfying life entails many things that would likely go against the markers of satisfaction for others. For Nussbaum, striving, labouring, and working towards lofty goals are integral markers that permit her to judge her life as satisfactory. These are likely not markers for life satisfaction for others. This significant variance in markers for satisfaction leads Nussbaum into one of her other central points, which is that there is no clear definition for what constitutes positive emotions or situations, which adds another level of complexity to any theory of happiness. 

Nussbaum explains that, while individuals tend to view certain situations and emotions as negative or positive, designation in this binary way is conceptually flawed. Instead, Nussbaum puts forth a more nuanced conception that states emotion is feedback from the external occurrences, and for this reason, not able to be categorized as merely positive or negative. She furthers this concept by explaining how even perceived negative emotions could lead to future positive outcomes. For example, if an individual suffers greatly, they can attribute a negative connotation to the suffering and yet emerge a stronger individual and likely more empathetic to those who suffer. There is a Chinese parable that echoes this idea that judging situations, emotions, or any binary conception as bad or good, is a simplistic way of viewing the world and thus conceptually misleading. 

The parable starts with a boy who breaks his leg. In response, the townsfolk respond with sympathy, expressing how bad the situation is. The parable continues with the draft for war, which the boy is exempt from as a result of his broken leg. In response, the townspeople respond by exalting how great it was that the boy broke his leg. The parable follows in this pattern with a situation that is initially viewed as unfavorable but then later reversed. This idea of truth existing in complexity debases the strength of any conception of happiness because happiness is based on a “good” or desired outcome. Viewing an outcome as good, or as more desired than an alternative, assigns some good or superior value to it, which, as we can see through the prior reasoning, is conceptually false. Nussbaum appreciates the eudaimonistic views of happiness, but for this reason and others, views these normative issues as too great and not applicable. 

Towards the ladder end of her essay, Nussbaum responds to the work of Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White who address the subjective state view of happiness. They critique the objective-list theory of happiness for being paternalistic and prescriptive in a way that overlooks the subjective differences in individuals’ conceptions of happiness, and thus limits individual liberty. Nussbaum responds to this attack by first separating her objective-list theory from others, explaining that her account of an objective list of happiness does not limit liberty but rather furthers it. She argues that her objective list of human capabilities consists of the basic needs, and having these provided or supported by governmental institutions would not prevent individuals from making their own choices in regards to their desired ends, or their conceptions of happiness. Nussbaum’s reasons that having these basic needs met, for example, being in good health, would allow individuals to take advantage and use their liberty of individual choice in regards to happiness. 

One of Nussbaum’s primary goals in writing this essay is to provide some clarity when it comes to the literature surrounding subjective theories of happiness. In doing this, she provides a level of nuance surrounding her assertions and admits uncertainty concerning her ideas to the extent that makes it difficult to accurately critique her assertions. Firstly, this is because most of the relevant critiques she has addressed, and secondly this is because her objective list theory is not supposed to provide an all-encompassing account of happiness but rather one to cover fundamental rights. The overarching issue is in the clarity in communication of these ideas and the general literature. Early in her essay, she exposes the lack of clarity surrounding the ideas of feeling vs. judgments in regards to life satisfaction conceptions of happiness. This clarity issue can also be seen in Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White’s critique of objective list theories of happiness. Nussbaum, in response to their critique, asserts that there must have been a misunderstanding or that they didn’t read certain sections of her essay that addresses paternalism in relation to her objective list theory. For this reason, I hesitate from making a direct attack against Nussbaum’s objective list theory and would assert that the central issue is the lack of clarity or imprecision. This is a criticism that Nussbaum herself voices and is an issue that does not need to be justified as it is self-evident. 

If I had to make a direct critique, I would attack Nussbaum’s objective-list theory for not sufficiently taking into account individual variance, which is a form of the paternalistic critique. Nussbaum argues against this critique when addressing Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White, stating that her objective list theory is not meant to be fully encompassing, but rather just meant to address basic needs. In stating this, she means to exempt this view from the critique, further reasoning that the provision of these basic needs does not require individuals to conform to these provisions. I would argue that even if the provision does not mitigate individual conformity to that provision, one’s environment has a coercive effect. While individual choice still exists, individuals will tend to take the easier route, which in this case would include provisions of the government. While Nussbaum’s argument holds, it does not mean that paternalism is wholly avoided. Through this reasoning it could be argued that Nussbaum’s objective list account of happiness is weak in that it devalues complete individual autonomy to their subjective conceptions of happiness, and through the coercive nature of the environment, individuals will be somewhat subjected to the provisions provided by the state.