In his essay “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Bertrand Russell presents a distinction between two forms of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell categorizes knowledge into these two types to explore how we can know things without direct sensory experience. Russell asks, “The problem I wish to consider is: What do we know in these cases, where the subject is merely described?” This refers to cases where we know something only by description, not through direct acquaintance (e.g., through sensory experience). In this essay, I will explain Russell’s distinction between these two types of knowledge, argue that knowledge by description can exist independently of knowledge by acquaintance, and critique his theory based on a counterexample where knowledge by description does not rely on acquaintance with the constituent parts of the object described.

Explanation of Russell’s Distinction:

Russell distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description as follows: Knowledge by acquaintance involves being “directly aware of the object itself,” and it is based on immediate sensory experience. This can include knowledge of physical objects, as well as knowledge of universals or the self. Acquaintance does not involve judgments—just pure experience. For example, when you observe the color yellow, that is knowledge by acquaintance. However, if you make a judgment about the yellow object (e.g., “It is bright yellow”), that turns into knowledge by description.

On the other hand, knowledge by description involves knowing about an object or concept without having direct sensory experience of it. For instance, one can know descriptively that the emperor of China is small, strong, and angry, without ever having encountered the emperor in person. The essential point for Russell is that knowledge by description presupposes knowledge by acquaintance of the components that make up the description. For example, to understand the description of the emperor as “strong,” one must have previous acquaintance with the concept of strength, which was learned through experience. Therefore, Russell argues that knowledge by description cannot exist independently of knowledge by acquaintance of its constituent parts.

Reasoning Behind the Theory:

Russell argues that knowledge by description requires knowledge by acquaintance of its constituent parts because we cannot truly understand a description unless we are acquainted with the elements involved. In his view, we cannot know what a tree is without having direct experience of it. If we have never encountered a tree, we can still know something about it descriptively (e.g., “A tree has leaves”), but to fully understand this description, we must be acquainted with the individual components (such as leaves, bark, and branches) through experience.

Russell asserts that we cannot make judgments or entertain suppositions without being acquainted with the subject of those judgments. He writes, “The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about.” Here, Russell implies that knowing must occur through acquaintance. However, this reasoning is not rigorous and relies on intuition rather than providing a concrete logical argument for why acquaintance must precede judgment.

Critique of Russell’s Theory:

I would argue that the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description does not accurately characterize linguistically derived knowledge. When we observe something, we inevitably interpret and categorize that sensory information as part of the process of thought. Even though we can mentally distinguish between raw sensory data and the interpretation of that data, these are part of the same process of acquiring knowledge. I would argue that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are not separate processes but part of the same method of acquiring knowledge.

To simplify, since categorization is a form of interpretation or judgment, and we naturally categorize what we sense, judgment is inherently tied to sensory experience. This means that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are intertwined. We cannot separate the experience of an object from the judgments we make about it, as they are part of the same cognitive process.

Furthermore, I would challenge Russell’s assertion that “It seems scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about.” I can think of numerous examples where judgments and suppositions are made without direct acquaintance with the subject. For instance, I am currently making judgments about Russell’s theories without having direct experience of him or his work. I have descriptive knowledge of his theories based on reading and understanding his writings, yet I can still form judgments about them.

One counterexample to Russell’s theory lies in the creation of a fictional world with new objects and relations among those objects. In a fictional world, the objects and relationships between them may not be directly acquainted with the creator, yet they form a coherent, describable system. Knowledge of the fictional world is descriptive, even though the constituent parts (the objects and relations) are derived from descriptive knowledge. This example challenges Russell’s theory by showing that it is possible for knowledge by description to exist without direct acquaintance with its constituents.

Conclusion:

Russell’s theory that knowledge by description depends on knowledge by acquaintance is insightful but ultimately flawed. The interconnection between sensory experience and judgment suggests that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are part of the same cognitive process. While acquaintance may be more foundational in some cases, it is not a necessary prerequisite for all knowledge by description. The counterexamples, particularly those involving fictional worlds or second-hand knowledge, illustrate that knowledge can exist descriptively without direct acquaintance. This suggests that our understanding of knowledge, particularly in relation to description and acquaintance, requires further refinement.